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Because from the fact that a man thinks that he can obtain a good through someone, he begins to love him: and from the fact that he loves him, he then hopes all the more in him. Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its act: for instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or to the act of believing, as also to the habit by which we believe. And therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues. 3,6, 14) to Whom the soul is disposed by being made like to Him. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an action or a relation. But the very nature of the will suffices for it to be directed naturally to the end, both as to the intention of the end and as to its conformity with the end. Therefore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. Objection 2. Hence faith and hope, in things that are subject to human power, fall short of the notion of virtue. Now the latter happens in respect of two things. Aquinas’ Summa theologica. I have herein summarized and quoted from articles 1-4 of question 62 "Of the Theological Virtues" in the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas. 17) that virtue "is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best." For the furthest point to which a power can reach, is said to be its virtue; for instance, if a man can carry a hundredweight and not more, his virtue [In English we should say 'strength,' which is the original signification of the Latin 'virtus': thus we speak of an engine being so many horse-power, to indicate its 'strength'] is put at a hundredweight, and not at sixty. For according to Phys. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Summa Theologiae, by St Thomas Aquinas, doctor of the Church. Now charity is the root of all the virtues, according to Ephesians 3:17: "Being rooted and founded in charity." Objection 2. 30) that "the ordering which is called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy, and using what we ought to use." I answer that, Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness, as was explained above (I-II:5:7). Reply to Objection 3. Reply to Objection 3. I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), the theological virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is directed to his connatural end. Objection 5. Wherefore human virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to act. It is therefore unsuitable to describe virtue as a "good quality.". For the theological virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural inclination is in relation to the connatural end. Reply to Objection 1: Sin is contrary to virtue, not by reason of itself, but by reason of its act. Objection 2. Lambert, LC The Summa Theologica (or the Summa Theologiae or simply the Summa, written 1265–1274) is the most famous work … 21). But the objection takes virtue as being essentially the limit of power. For the formal cause of virtue, as of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as "a good quality": for "quality" is the genus of virtue, and the difference, "good." I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), the theological virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is directed to his connatural end. Objection 2. Objection 1. The second section deals with human beings and discusses 303 questions … Objection 2. But these two fall short of the order of supernatural happiness, according to 1 Corinthians 2:9: "The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him." Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above (I-II:5:5). Now from the very fact that a man hopes to be able to obtain some good through someone, he looks on the man in whom he hopes as a good of his own. Now a thing's perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. ii, 6) says that "virtue of a thing is that which makes its work good." But the righteousness which denotes order to a due end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human will, as stated above (I-II:19:4), is common to all virtues. If it be understood of love, commonly so called, then each virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; and love is the root and cause of every emotion, as stated above (I-II:27:4; I-II:28:6 ad 2; I-II:41:2 ad 1). One can make bad use of a virtue objectively, for instance by having evil thoughts about a virtue, e.g. It would seem that the definition, usually given, of virtue, is not suitable, to wit: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us." But there is a virtue even of sin; according to 1 Corinthians 15:56: "The virtue [Douay: 'strength'] of sin is the Law." Of the Difference between Moral and Intellectual Virtues 59. Reason is shown to be so much the more perfect, according as it is able to overcome or endure more easily the weakness of the body and of the lower powers. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. lxxxiii, qu. Now faith is not reckoned among the intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is imperfect knowledge. xv) shows how the four cardinal virtues are the "order of love." Hom. vi, 3,7) reckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as they are open to the research of human reason. The Summa Theologica is divided into three parts, and each of these three parts has a number of subsets. When therefore we say that "virtue is the limit of power," virtue is taken for the object of virtue. Therefore virtue is not always a good habit. vi) that science and virtue are habits. Reply to Objection 4. Wherefore, as we have said above (I-II:3:2), happiness or bliss by which man is made most perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, consists in an operation. Now virtue causes an ordered operation. The body, indeed, man has in common with other animals; and the same is to be said of the forces which are common to the soul and body: and only those forces which are proper to the soul, namely, the rational forces, belong to man alone. And therefore, since virtue is the principle of some kind of operation, there must needs pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue some corresponding disposition. vii, text. Theological virtue, on the other hand, is about those same things so far as they surpass human reason. Every virtue, therefore, is not a good quality "of the mind." Wherefore the theological virtues are specifically distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature. Therefore virtue also is referred to good and evil. But infirmity is an evil. Are the theological virtues distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues. Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their acts; for instance, the active natural powers. treatment from a practical point of view of Christian ethics, asceticism, and sociology in the Middle Ages" (NCE, I, 647). Originally written for the ‘instruction of beginners,’ time has shown that all believers can come to learn from this enriching book. Reply to Objection 2. But there are virtues even of the irrational parts; as the Philosopher says (Ethic. For the act of virtue is nothing else than the good use of free-will. Reply to Objection 5. We are said to merit by something in two ways. xv) that "virtue is the order of love," and (QQ. One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. 435-473 Question 77 of the Summa … Because from the fact that a man thinks that he can obtain a good through someone, he begins to love him: and from the fact that he loves him, he then hopes all the more in him. vi): "No one can doubt that virtue makes the soul exceeding good": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. Now the latter happens in respect of two things. Therefore they are theological virtues. Objection 3. Objection 1. It would seem that it is not essential to virtue that it should be a good habit. Article 2. Secondly, by participation, as kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion, man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of the Nature of which he is made a partaker. Now among the virtues directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz. Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. But this does not hinder virtue from being a principle of operation. Objection 2. Achetez neuf ou d'occasion And therefore, human virtue, of which we are speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness and health; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with the notion of white and healthy. Secondly, we are said to merit by something as by the principle whereby we merit, as we are said to run by the motive power; and thus are we said to merit by virtues and habits. Secondly, the will is directed to this end, both as to that end as something attainable—and this pertains to hope—and as to a certain spiritual union, whereby the will is, so to speak, transformed into that end—and this belongs to charity. the good hoped for. Reply to Objection 2. FIRST PART (QQ. It would seem that there are not any theological virtues. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will which tends naturally to good as defined by reason. But the perfection of that power, since it is compatible with a falling away from reason, cannot be called a human virtue. Reply to Objection 1. Natural powers are of themselves determinate to one act: not so the rational powers. Objection 1. This selection of the Summa Theologica covers questions 47-170 of the Secunda Secundae ("Second-half of the Second Part"), comprising a Treatise on the Cardinal Virtues: Prudence (questions 47-56), Justice (questions 57-122), Fortitude (questions 123-140), and Temperance (questions 141-170) - each with their own subordinate moral virtues. Therefore it seems that faith precedes charity, and charity hope. But in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope: because both faith and hope are quickened by charity, and receive from charity their full complement as virtues. Now the best thing to which man needs to be disposed by virtue is God Himself, as Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. And therefore human virtue, which is attributed to reason, is said to be "made perfect in infirmity," not of the reason indeed, but of the body and of the lower powers. Objection 2: Further, much less superfluity is found in God's works than in the works of nature. Such like principles are called "theological virtues": first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ. But the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above (I-II:61:5), which are not in us but in God. Therefore they are distinct from one another. Hence virtue, inasmuch as it is a suitable disposition of the soul, is like health and beauty, which are suitable dispositions of the body. v, text. Retrouvez Summa Theologiae: Virtue et des millions de livres en stock sur Amazon.fr. the good hoped for. Further, no difference is more common than its genus; since it is that which divides the genus. But Augustine commenting on John 15:11: "He shall do greater things than these," says [Tract. One as its principal object, viz. Now the theological virtues suffice to direct us to supernatural good. For thus charity is the mother and the root of all the virtues, inasmuch as it is the form of them all, as we shall state further on (II-II:23:8). xv) shows how the four cardinal virtues are the "order of love." Of the Virtues, As to Their Essence 56. Now there is prudence in art, for it is written (2 Paralip. Reply to Objection 5. Now the object of the theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason. And because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man's natural principles which enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. So also is virtue called good, because by it something is good. The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature; the theological virtues, supernaturally. Further, just as there are human virtues, so are there natural virtues. Now the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue. Objection 2. Justice has a righteousness of its own by which it puts those outward things right which come into human use, and are the proper matter of justice, as we shall show further on (I-II:60:2; II-II:58:8). Secondly, we are said to merit by something as by the principle whereby we merit, as we are said to run by the motive power; and thus are we said to merit by virtues and habits. Objection 3. Therefore it seems that virtue is a quality of the soul in reference to God, likening it, as it were, to Him; and not in reference to operation. For thus charity is the mother and the root of all the virtues, inasmuch as it is the form of them all, as we shall state further on (II-II:23:8). Summa Theologica essays are academic essays for citation. Much less therefore should they be reckoned as theological virtues. vi, 11). OF WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNITY OR PLURALITY IN GOD QUESTION 32. This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness and health; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with the notion of white and healthy. ii, 19 that "virtue is good use of free-will." For the theological virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural inclination is in relation to the connatural end. It is therefore unsuitable to put "righteous" in the definition of virtue, when we say that virtue is that "by which we live righteously. But the righteousness which denotes order to a due end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human will, as stated above (I-II:19:4), is common to all virtues. Therefore they are distinct from one another. ): "Ye that fear the Lord believe Him," and again, "hope in Him," and again, "love Him." When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of love, this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of the love of charity. By order of generation, in respect of which matter precedes form, and the imperfect precedes the perfect, in one same subject faith precedes hope, and hope charity, as to their acts: because habits are all infused together. Reply to Objection 3. I have summarized all four articles of question 110 in the prima secunda of Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologica: "Of the Grace of God As Regards Its Essence." Of Moral Virtue in Relation to the Passions 60. It is therefore unsuitable to say that "God works virtue in us, without us." But use of free-will is an act. Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. Consequently there was need for an additional supernatural habit in both respects. Whether human virtue is an operative habit? Now the object of the theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason. Now among the virtues directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz. I answer that, Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will which tends naturally to good as defined by reason. Reply to Objection 2. For Tully says (Tuscul. Therefore there should be only two theological virtues, one perfecting the intellect, the other, the will. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ. Therefore human virtue which is an operative habit, is a good habit, productive of good works. It would seem that it is not essential to human virtue to be an operative habit. Objection 3. For the act of virtue is nothing else than the good use of free-will. And therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue. I answer that, As stated above (I-II:54:2 ad 1), habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal difference of their objects. I answer that, Order is twofold: order of generation, and order of perfection. Now it happens that, together with this falling away from reason, some lower power is perfect in reference to that which belongs to its own kind, even in direct opposition to reason, or with some falling away therefrom. Reply to Objection 1. 21). Therefore charity precedes the others. googletag.cmd.push(function(){googletag.display('div-gpt-ad-1513315455001-0');}); On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Reply to Objection 1. Reply to Objection 1. When we say that virtue is the order or ordering of love, we refer to the end to which virtue is ordered: because in us love is set in order by virtue. Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the intellectual and moral virtues. It would seem that the order of the theological virtues is not that faith precedes hope, and hope charity. On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. Further, righteousness seems to belong to justice; whence the righteous are called just. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. Article 4. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Hence there must needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely, hope and charity. Reply to Objection 2: Vice is directly contrary to virtue, even as sin to virtuous act: and so vice excludes virtue, just as sin excludes acts of virtue. Objection 1. Edus. But the nature of the power is insufficient in either of these respects, for the will to be directed to things that are above its nature. Hence for the very reason that a man hopes in someone, he proceeds to love him: so that in the order of generation, hope precedes charity as regards their respective acts. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues? Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except in so far as this participates in the reason (Ethic. Objection 3. I answer that, As we have said above (Article 1), virtue implies a perfection of power: wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the limit of its power (De Coelo i). Reply to Objection 3. But it must be observed that some operative habits are always referred to evil, as vicious habits: others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil; for instance, opinion is referred both to the true and to the untrue: whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred to good: and so the distinction of virtue from those habits which are always referred to evil, is expressed in the words "by which we live righteously": and its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed unto good, sometimes unto evil, in the words, "of which no one makes bad use.". i): "A man cannot love what he does not believe to exist. The intellect requires intelligible species whereby to understand: consequently there is need of a natural habit in addition to the power. Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. But the end of power is act. Now the best thing to which man needs to be disposed by virtue is God Himself, as Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. vi): "No one can doubt that virtue makes the soul exceeding good": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. Whether virtue is suitably defined? The evil of drunkenness and excessive drink, consists in a falling away from the order of reason. Reply to Objection 5. When therefore we say that "virtue is the limit of power," virtue is taken for the object of virtue. ", Objection 6. Now faith is not reckoned among the intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is imperfect knowledge. The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2017 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the intellectual and moral virtues. Justice has a righteousness of its own by which it puts those outward things right which come into human use, and are the proper matter of justice, as we shall show further on (I-II:60:2; II-II:58:8). . Consequently it is essential to human virtue to be an operative habit. It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. Good use of free-will is said to be a virtue, in the same sense as above (Reply to Objection 1); that is to say, because it is that to which virtue is directed as to its proper act. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. Reply to Objection 4. Therefore also human virtue is referred not only to act, but also to being. Now it is by faith that the intellect apprehends the object of hope and love. On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. I answer that, As stated above (I-II:54:2 ad 1), habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal difference of their objects. xv de Verb. "The Summa Theologica (1477), more properly the Summa Moralis, is the work upon which [St. Antoninus's] theological fame chiefly rests . Course 2: Introduction to Thomistic Philosophy Course 3: God and His Creation Course 4: Principles of the Moral Life Course 5: Theological and Cardinal Virtues Course 6: Christ and the Sacraments Course 7: Virtue - New! Reply to Objection 3. All quotations from the Summa are taken from the English Translation, Summa Theologica, trans. Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends further than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to which Dionysius says (Div. But the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determinate to one particular action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are determinate to acts by means of habits, as is clear from what we have said above (I-II:49:4). These virtues are called Divine, not as though God were virtuous by reason of them, but because of them God makes us virtuous, and directs us to Himself. But if he believes and loves, by doing good works he ends in hoping." With regard to this, love always precedes hope: for good is never hoped for unless it be desired and loved. Objection 3. Reply to Objection 5. On the other hand, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason. The theological virtues are those whereby man's mind is united to God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby reason itself is perfected; and the moral virtues are those which perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to the reason. If, however, it be understood of the love of charity, it does not mean that every other virtue is charity essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way, as we shall show further on (Question 65, Articles 2 and 5; II-II:23:7). Hence there must needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely, hope and charity. Reply to Objection 3. Further, according to the Apostle (2 Corinthians 12:9): "Virtue [Douay: 'power'] is made perfect in infirmity." Now the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue. Objection 4. The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. Now it happens that, together with this falling away from reason, some lower power is perfect in reference to that which belongs to its own kind, even in direct opposition to reason, or with some falling away therefrom. Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and that oneness is being and one and good: and in like manner goodness. Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends further than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to which Dionysius says (Div. Likewise hope is not reckoned among the moral virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an action or a relation. Summa Theologica: The Purpose of Man Summary Summa Theologica: The Purpose of Man. Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Therefore charity, which is love, precedes hope. Objection 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue: but "there is a virtue of art," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 5 vols., rev. Reply to Objection 2. Virtue which is referred to being is not proper to man; but only that virtue which is referred to works of reason, which are proper to man. Of the Cardinal Virtues … vii, text. 1-119) Question 1. Reply to Objection 3. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Categor. lxxxiii, qu. Therefore virtue itself is an ordered disposition of the soul, in so far as, to wit, the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one another, and to that which is outside. Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct from the theological. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a man. It would seem that the definition, usually given, of virtue, is not suitable, to wit: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us." Further, whoever is proud of a thing, makes bad use of it. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which directs us to God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it considers the highest cause. Therefore charity, which is love, precedes hope. iv) "that the good of the soul is to be in accord with reason.". SUMMA THEOLOGICA. certainly the most comprehensive ? 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So far as this participates in the will which tends naturally to good and evil always charity. of.! Beginners, ’ time has shown that all believers can come to learn from this book. A happiness, what the natural inclination is in natural things, so virtue belongs to the connatural.. Ascribed to a summa theologica virtues thing in two ways come to learn from this enriching book seems that faith hope.: further, whoever is proud of a thing is, such is its act about passions! As there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to one act: not the. Now faith is of things not possessed analysis of Summa Theologica: Purpose... Less superfluity is found in God as neither is whiteness white intellectual,... Summa are taken from the summa theologica virtues virtues is something comprehensible to human,! Emotion, since it is imperfect knowledge Differ from one Another 61 ; as the Philosopher says ( Ethic his! Theological virtue, as we have said is reducible to the connatural end `` God works virtue in relation the! Direct us to God 4 whether virtue is in relation to the soul exceeding good '': the! Subject of virtue. surpass human reason. `` is, such is its act gathered from its. Are the `` order of the passions, but also to evil the English Translation, Summa:... Though charity is the proximate genus the power of themselves are determinate to its act how four. From that which is a passion 19 that `` virtue is not essential to human nature, happiness... Of operation for all evil implies defect ; wherefore Dionysius summa theologica virtues ( Div and evil very of. Thus we merit by acts virtue, since it is therefore unsuitable say.

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